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Abstract—Recent research studies revealed that neural net-
works are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. State-of-the-art
defensive techniques add various adversarial examples in train-
ing to improve models’ adversarial robustness. However, these
methods are not universal and can’t defend unknown or non-
adversarial evasion attacks. In this paper, we analyze the model
robustness in the decision space. A feedback learning method is
then proposed, to understand how well a model learns and to
facilitate the retraining process of remedying the defects. The
evaluations according to a set of distance-based criteria show
that our method can significantly improve models’ accuracy and
robustness against different types of evasion attacks. Moreover,
we observe the existence of inter-class inequality and propose
to compensate for it by changing the proportions of examples
generated in different classes.
Index Terms—robustness, neural networks, decision space,
evasion attacks, feedback learning
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the broad applications of deep learning
techniques are the most inspiring advancements of machine
learning [1]. Compared to early attempts on neural networks [2],
[3], modern deep learning models introduce more layers with
complex structures and nonlinear transformations to model a
high-level abstraction of data [4]. The ability to learn from
examples makes deep learning particularly attractive to cog-
nitive applications, such as image and speech recognition [5],
[6], object detection [7], natural language processing [8], etc.
Moreover, deep learning systems demonstrated fascinating
performance in many real-world applications and achieved
near or even beyond human-level accuracy in solving clas-
sification problems in such domains, including handwritten
digit recognition [9], image classification [10], semantic scene
understanding [11], etc.
The security industry has also adopted machine learning
techniques in its practices [12]–[14]. Many of these applications
are based on the strong classification capability of the learning
models, including surveillance [15], authentication [12], facial
recognition [16], vehicle detection [13], and crowd behavior
analysis [14].
However, recent research discovered that machine learning
and neural network models are susceptible to adversarial
attacks, which apply small perturbations on input samples
to fool models [17]. Such attacks generally downgrade models’
confidence levels on inputs and even result in misclassifica-
tions [18]. The amplitude of the perturbation that is used in
adversarial attacks (a.k.a. adversarial strength) can be quite
small or even imperceptible to the human eyes. Furthermore,
Papernot et al. discovered that an elaborately-perturbed example
(i.e., adversarial example) is transferable: the adversarial
example crafted by a substitute model can not only deceive
itself but also influence other models (e.g., victim models),
even without knowing the internal structures and parameters
of these victim models [19]. These properties raise severe
concerns on the security of deep learning technique.
A lot of research efforts have been put on adversarial
examples and adversarial attacks [20]. Most works focused on
maximizing the classification error (for attacks)/accuracy (for
defenses) while minimizing the difference/distance between
adversarial examples and original samples [17], [19], [21], [22].
As research are going further and deeper, the robustness of
neural networks emerges as the new focus. Adversarial attacks
are categorized as one type of evasion attacks, which fool
neural networks by introducing deliberately-modified examples
at test time. The ultimate goal of improving model robustness is
defending not only adversarial attacks, but any types of evasion
attacks that attackers may conduct. One possible solution
and explanation are based on the decision space analysis.
We summarize the adversarial-based and decision-space-based
related works in Section II.
Compared to the existing works on neural network security
problems, especially on the adversarial attack and defense
schemes, our major contributions in this work can be summa-
rized as follows:
• We prove the relation between the model robustness and
margins (distances between samples and decision boundaries)
in the decision space;
• We analyze the model robustness in the decision space based
on an existing work [23] and propose a set of distance-based
criteria to evaluate it;
• We find out inter-class inequality exists in all datasets
discussed in this work and class robustness can be utilized
to improve model’s overall robustness;
• We propose a universal feedback learning method with inter-
class inequality compensation to facilitate model retraining;
• We show our method is effective in improving model
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accuracy and robustness against multiple types of evasion
attacks with experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II summarizes the existing works about adversarial attacks
and decision-space-based methods; Section III introduces the
motivation of this work; Section IV presents the details of our
proposed method together with theoretical proof on method
effectiveness; Section V discusses the experimental results; At
last, we conclude this work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Adversarial Related Topics
Kurakin et al. [24] showed that combining small batches
of both adversarial examples and original data in adversarial
training could make the model more resilient to adversarial
attacks. Carlini and Wagner [21] demonstrated that defensive
distillation does not significantly enhance the robustness of
neural networks in some scenarios by introducing three new
attack algorithms. Cisse et al. [25] introduced a layer-wise
regularization method to reduce the neural network’s sensitivity
to small perturbations, which are difficult to be visually caught.
These adversarial-based approaches usually are effective for
one or several specific adversarial attacks/defenses, but still
vulnerable to different types or new adversarial attacks/defenses
methods. For example, Athalye et al. claimed that the attacks
based-on their newly-proposed obfuscated gradients (which
is a kind of gradient masking method) could circumvent
7 out of 9 noncertified white-box-secure defenses, all of
which were accepted by International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR) 2018 [26]. This shocking fact alerted
the researchers in the area about the importance of universality
for both attack and defense methods.
B. Decision Related Topics
Adopted from the statistics community, a decision space
(a.k.a an input space) refers to a vector space where all
input samples lie. Decision boundaries are hyper-surfaces that
partition the decision space into separate sets. During the
learning of decision boundaries, neural networks attempt to
minimize the empirical error, while support vector machines
(SVMs) tend to maximize the empirical margin between the
decision boundary and input samples [27].
Besides the common MinMax-based adversarial researches,
the latest studies shift the focus to the meaning of adversarial-
related problems in decision spaces directly. Trame`r et al.
[28] introduced methods of finding multiple orthogonal ad-
versarial directions and showed that these perturbations span
a multidimensional contiguous space of misclassified points.
They believe that the higher the dimensionality of adversarial
perturbations is, the more likely the subspaces of two models
will intersect. Brendel et al. introduced the boundary attack,
a decision-based attack that starts from a large adversarial
perturbation and then seeks to reduce the perturbation while
staying adversarial [29].
Cao and Gong aimed to increase the robustness of neural
networks [30]. Instead of using only a test sample to determine
which class it belongs to, hundreds of neighboring samples
are generated in the surrounding hypercube and a voting
algorithm is applied to decide the true label of the test
sample. The results show that this straight-forward defense
method is effective in improving neural networks’ robustness
in the sense of adversarial aspects without sacrificing the
classification accuracy on legitimate examples. The method
could substantially reduce the success rates of CW attacks [21]
while other defense methods (such as adversarial training and
distillation) couldn’t.
Inspired by this region-based classification method [30], He
et al. [23] moved from hypercubes to larger neighborhoods.
They proposed an orthogonal-direction ensemble attack called
OptMargin, which could evade the region-based classification
defense mentioned in [30]. They also analyzed margins
(between samples and decision boundaries) and adjacent class
information, then built a simple neural network to detect
adversarial examples with these analysis results.
Another state-of-the-art decision-based defense is proposed
in [31]. Madry et al. found projected gradient descent (PGD)
is a universal adversary among first-order approaches. To
guarantee the adversarial robustness of the model, they re-
started PGD from many points in the l∞ balls around data
points to generate adversarial examples for training. The idea
is intriguing, but it cannot provide a concrete guarantee against
non-adversarial evasion attacks. In [32], a novel loss function
is introduced to impose a margin on any layers of a model. To
the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of the existing works
discovers or deals with inter-class inequality mentioned in the
following Section III.
III. MOTIVATION
Inspired by Trame`r et al.’s work [28], we form an assumption
on how generated examples facilitate the robustness improve-
ment: generated examples can “push” decision boundaries
towards other classes, which enlarges the margins between real
samples and decision boundaries. By retraining with generated
examples in different directions, the margins of decision
boundaries will enlarge. An illustration of this assumption
with adversarial examples is given in Fig. 1.
Essentially, neural networks minimize the empirical error,
while SVMs maximize the empirical margin between the
decision boundary and training samples. These approaches
Fig. 1: How do adversarial examples work in adversarial
training.
have different objective functions, but target at the similar or
even the same ultimate goal, that is, to classify the samples into
correct classes as accurate as possible. Since most attacks are
distance-based, the objective of model training shall include
not only high accuracy but also large margins.
In many adversarial-related researches [17], [19], [21], [22],
the adversarial strengths are limited to certain ranges to
guarantee the distortions are imperceptible. This limitation
is equivalent to restricting the l2 distance between original
samples and adversarial examples. As defined, adversarial
examples are supposed to cross decision boundaries and be
misclassified with the minimum moving effort. If the model’s
decision boundaries can be trained to be far from every sample,
then the generation of boundary-crossing examples (including
adversarial examples) will be more difficult. As a result, the
model’s robustness against evasion attacks will be improved.
This assumption will be further proved in Section IV.
What’s more, this kind of defense method is more general-
ized: not only is it beneficial to adversarial defenses, but also it
can alleviate the damage of any distance-related evasion attack.
In real-world scenarios, images captured by self-driving cars,
security cameras, and webcams suffer from large noise and
could totally vitiate classifiers. If the margin between samples
and decision boundaries can be greatly increased, the model’s
robustness will be improved positively-correlated.
When observing all the margins and adjacent/destination
classes (the first predicted class other than the original class
as a sample keeps moving in any fixed direction), we discover
another remarkable fact: adjacent classes are not equally-
distributed, even though every class has the equal amount
of training samples (6,000 training samples per class for
MNIST [3] and 5,000 for CIFAR-10 [33]). In Table I, the
percentages mark the proportions of total random search that
fall into the corresponding adjacent class. As can be seen that
class 3 and Bird are the most robust (adjacent) classes in
MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively, and class 0 and Horse
are the most vulnerable (adjacent) classes. We name this
phenomenon as inter-class inequality.
The proportional differences between vulnerable classes
and robust classes are so tremendous that raises the question
whether each class has the same robustness level. One hypoth-
esis is that different classes have different spatial occupancy,
which affect the construction of decision boundaries. A robust
class has a relatively large volume in the high-dimensional
decision space, while a vulnerable class has a smaller volume
region. As far as we observe from the results, vulnerable classes
are adjacent to more classes, while robust ones are adjacent to
fewer classes. If we can take class robustness into account, the
model robustness can also be improved via improving class
robustness. This will be further discussed in Section IV.
IV. FEEDBACK LEARNING AND THEORETICAL PROOF
To alleviate the robustness problem and inter-class inequality
mentioned in Section III, we refine the boundary search
originally presented by He et al. [23] and propose feedback
learning (F.L.). Its principle is to understand how well the
Algorithm 1: Feedback Learning Algorithm.
1. Training: // n training samples.
model.train(samples, labels)
2. Sample Selection: // s random samples.
selected index← shuffle(arange(n))[: s]
3. Direction and Margin Calculation:
for i in selected index do
for j in random dirs do
for step = 0 to max step do
new sample←
samples[selected index[i]] + step× j;
new label← model(new sample);
if new label 6= labels[selected index[i]] then
[margin(i, j), adjacent(i, j)]← [step,
new label] // Record results.
break;
4. Example Generation:
count← 0;
for k in selected index do
examples[count++]← generate(samples[k], labels[k],
margin[k], adjacent[k], random dirs);
[retrain examples, retrain labels]←
shuffle([samples, labels],
[examples, labels[selected index]]);
5. Retraining and Testing:
/* Retrain on the trained model. */
model.train(retrain examples, retrain labels)
model.test(test samples, test labels) // Test.
model learns and generate the corresponding examples to
facilitate the retraining process. The procedures of the complete
feedback learning method can be divided into five steps:
training, sample selection, direction and margin calculation
(the boundary search), example generation, and retraining
and testing. Algorithm 1 gives a demonstrative realization
of the feedback learning algorithm. In order to avoid confusion,
we specify that “samples” are legitimate, authentic, genuine
samples collected from the real-world, and “examples” are
generated or perturbed instances. The detail about example
generation will be discussed in Section IV-B.
A. Robustness Measurement
First, we introduce the model’s mean margin matrix M ,
of which the i-th row, j-th column element mij is
mij =
∑
yl=j
∑
yk=i
∥∥∥ηk,l ~dk,l∥∥∥
2
Ni,j
=
∑
yl=j
∑
yk=i
ηk,l
Ni,j
, (1)
where, ηk,l and ~dk,l respectively denote the margin and unit
vector between samples and decision boundaries. All distances,
margins mentioned in this paper are based on Euclidean metric.
The numerator in the right hand side of Equation (1) means
the summed margins from all samples in class i to the decision
boundary between class i and class j. Ni,j is the total number
of margins added for the origin and adjacent class pair (i, j).
As discussed in previous section, we define the model’s
robustness as the margins between samples and decision
boundaries. The relation can be formed as:
R =
c∑
j=1
c∑
i=1
mij , (2)
TABLE I: The proportions of adjacent classes show the inter-class inequality phenomenon. “N/A” means the search ends with
no adjacent class found. The higher the percentage, the more robust the adjacent class is.
MNIST 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 N/A
Adjacent 0.02% 0.60% 1.59% 5.31% 4.52% 2.30% 1.07% 0.54% 4.29% 0.82% 78.95%
CIFAR-10 Airplane Automobile Bird Cat Deer Dog Frog Horse Ship Truck N/A
Adjacent 0.20% 0.15% 44.61% 11.40% 7.51% 0.27% 25.62% 0.02% 2.47% 0.37% 7.39%
where c is the total number of classes and R denotes the
robustness level of the model. A larger R means the bigger
overall margin and better robustness for the model.
Moreover, we define class robustness Ri by:
Ri =
∑c
j=1mjiNj,i∑c
j=1mijNi,j
. (3)
Here we use summed margin to better express both margin
and total number of traverses for each class, as there may exist
cases with large mij and small Ni,j or small mij and large
Ni,j . In such cases, mean margin can not reflect how many
traverses happen in the given experiment settings, while the
summed margin can.
According to Equation (3), the class robustness of any class
i could be described as a ratio between total margins of class
i as adjacent class and total margins of class i as origin class.
The numerator measures the defensiveness of class i, and the
denominator represents its offensiveness. If Ri is greater than
1.0, we believe class i is robust and mild. Otherwise, class i
is vulnerable if Ri is less than 1.0. The class robustness Ri
can be used to measure the model’s inter-class inequality and
indicate which classes need further training.
B. Example Generation Criteria
Considering inter-class inequality of different classes, vul-
nerable classes have smaller margins and are prone to being
transferred by other classes, while robust classes have relatively
larger margins. Here, we utilize a straight-forward approach
to improve the class robustness of vulnerable classes: by
increasing the proportion of examples in vulnerable classes.
To be specific, all classes are categorized into three robustness
levels, with three different settings for generating examples.
If Ri is among the top 20% of all classes, it has “high-level
robustness” and only 20 samples in class i are chosen for
generating retraining examples (“minimum selection”). If Ri
is among the bottom 50% in all classes, class i has “low-
level robustness” and 150 samples will be utilized (“maximum
selection”). Otherwise, class i has “medium-level robustness”
and 100 samples will be utilized (“medium selection”).
For each chosen sample, we generate retraining examples in
40 different directions with the top-40 minimum margins. The
generation strength is 1.5×−2.0× the margins we measured,
which could guarantee boundary crossing (a theoretical proof
on boundary retraining is provided in Section IV-C). In this
way, we construct a retraining dataset, shuffled with generated
examples and all original training samples. Please note that all
parameters mentioned here are empirical.
Fig. 2: A binary classification scenario.
C. Theoretical Derivation
To prove that retraining could positively influence decision
boundaries, let us start with a binary classification problem
illustrated in Figure 2. Here, ~x ∈ RD is any D-dimensional
input. The binary classifier can be described as f(~x, ~θ), where ~θ
is the parameter. The decision boundary f(~x, ~θ) = 0 separates
class A (f(~x, ~θ) < 0) and class B (f(~x, ~θ) > 0). Assume a
training example ~x0 in class A with f(~x0, ~θ) < 0. Unit vector
~g is the gradient direction from ~x0 towards f(~x, ~θ) = 0, and
unit vector ~d is a random direction. The loss function L(~x) is:
L(~x) =
1
2n
∑
~x
∥∥∥y(~x)− f(~x, ~θ) σ∥∥∥2
2
. (4)
Here, n is the total number of samples trained, y(~x) ={−1, if class A
1, if class B is the label of samples, σ is the activation
function, and  is the Hadamard product.
Lemma 1: If ∃η0 > 0, s.t.f(~x0 + η0 ~d, ~θ) = 0, then the
direction ~d will have a positive contribution to the gradient ~g,
that is: cos
〈
~d,~g
〉
> 0.
Proof : As vector η0~d can be decomposed using vector
resolution such as η0 ~d = η1~g + η2~t, in which ~t is the tangent
direction of f(~x, ~θ) = 0, ~η1 > 0. Thus:
cos
〈
~d,~g
〉
= cos
〈
η1
η0
~g +
η2
η0
~t,~g
〉
=
cos
〈
η1
η0
~g,~g
〉
+ cos
〈
η2
η0
~t,~g
〉
=
η1
η0
‖~g‖22 > 0.
(5)
After retraining with a generated example ~xe = ~x0 + η~d, with
η > η0, we get a new boundary f(~x, ~θ) = 0.
Theorem 1: After training with ~xe, the new classifier f(~x, ~θe)
satisfies f(~xe, ~θe) < f(~xe, ~θ).
Proof : The loss introduced by ~xe is:
L(~xe) =
1
2
∥∥∥y(~xe)− f(~xe, ~θ) σ∥∥∥2
2
=
1
2
[1 + f(~xe, ~θ) σ]2.
(6)
In backpropagation, weights and biases are updated as:
~we = ~w − α∂L( ~xe)
∂ ~w
= ~w − α[f(~xe, ~θ) (σ + σσ′)]∂f( ~xe,
~θ)
∂ ~w
,
(7a)
~be = ~b− α∂L( ~xe)
∂~b
= ~b− α[f(~xe, ~θ) (σ + σσ′)]. (7b)
α > 0 is the learning rate of the classifier and σ′ is the
derivative of σ. We denote δσ = f(~xe, ~θ) (σ + σσ′).
Since ~xe will be misclassified by the original boundary, we
have f(~xe, ~θ) > 0, then δσ > 0.
Suppose the binary classifier only has one layer, f(~x, ~θ) =
~w~x+~b. Then:
f(~xe, ~θe)− f(~xe, ~θ) = (~we − ~w)~xe + (~be −~b). (8)
Based on Equation (7a) and Equation (7b), we can replace ~we
and ~be in Equation (8) with ~w and ~b:
f(~xe, ~θe)− f(~xe, ~θ) = −αδσ(‖~xe‖22 + 1) < 0. (9)
f(~x, ~θ) = ~w(l)[fl−1(~x, ~θl−1)  σ] + ~b(l) if f(~x, ~θ) is a non-
linear function. Here l is the total number of layers of f(~x, ~θ),
~w(l) and ~b(l) are parameters in the last layer, fl−1 is the
representation of the first (l − 1) layers, and ~θl−1 is all
parameters in fl−1. Following similar steps as Equation (9):
f(~xe, ~θe)− f(~xe, ~θ) =
(~w(l)e − ~w(l))fl−1(~xe, ~θl−1) + (~b(l)e −~b(l)) =
− αδσ(
∥∥∥f(~xe, ~θl−1)∥∥∥2
2
+ 1) < 0.
(10)
Therefore, we can guarantee that f(~xe, ~θe) < f(~xe, ~θ) after
retraining with ~xe in the binary classifier f(~x, ~θ).
Now we consider multiclass classification problems. Learn-
ing directly from Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [34], we know that
mapping multiple labels is (or can be approximated as) a one-
vs-all classification scheme. Moreover, our feedback learning
method only focuses on one sample and one direction at a
time. Two classes at most could be involved with any sample
and direction pair. Thus, it is always a binary classification
problem in our case.
V. CASE STUDY
To prove the effectiveness of our proposed method, exper-
iments were conducted with two models on two datasets: a
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) on MNIST and a ResNet
[35] on CIFAR-10. For both settings, we randomly picked
1,500 samples from training sets and performed boundary
searches in orthogonal directions. We adopted the linear search
method from He et al. [23] to find margins and adjacent
classes: For MNIST, 784 random orthogonal directions were
searched with step size 0.02 (the dimension of a MNIST
sample is 784 and pixel values are 0 to 1) in both positive and
negative directions. For CIFAR-10, 1,000 random orthogonal
directions were searched with step size 2.0 (the dimension of
Fig. 3: Accuracy curves of interested models under FGSM
attacks on MNIST.
a CIFAR-10 sample is 3,072 and pixel values are 0 to 255).
We trained and retrained our models with parameter settings
derived from Madry et al. [31] on Tensorflow (v1.8.0) [36].
Most of the attacks we performed were using the Cleverhans
library (v2.1.0) [37].
In Figure 3 and the rest of this paper, we will use the
following abbreviations for the models: Ori. is the original one,
Adv. was adversarially-trained by Madry et al. [31], F.L. was
retrained from the original model using feedback learning with
compensation to inter-class inequality, and Reduced F.L. was
retrained without considering inter-class inequality. The results
show that feedback learning, both with or without inequality
compensation, achieve better results than original training under
FGSM attacks [18]. For adversarial strength less than 0.4, the
state-of-the-art adversarial model is the most accurate, while
feedback learning surpasses it when the perturbation further
increases. It is widely accepted that adversarial strength of
0.3 is large enough for any adversarial attacks on MNIST
dataset. Benefiting from the randomness in direction selection,
feedback learning can guarantee larger margins for more
general directions and defend against severe attacks. The Adv.
model performs even worse than the Ori. model at adversarial
strength 0.5. In fact, the defense of the Adv. model degrades
as the attack strength increases and when attack and defense
methods differ. Our proposed feedback learning, in contrast,
can defend adversarial-based attacks, even it does not use any
adversarial-related information.
A. Margin Improvement and Inter-class Inequality Mitigation
In Table II, class center images (CCIs) are defined as
examples with the largest mean margins in each class. First,
we searched over the 1,500-sample set to find one CCI for
each class and two different CCI sets were found based on two
models (because the boundaries and margins are different in
different models). Then we applied a linear search to measure
the margins from CCIs to the decision boundaries of four
models: Ori., Adv., F.L., and Reduced F.L.. The results are
concluded as follows:
• The Ori. model has the worst mean margin performance for
both CCI sets. The F.L. model has the largest mean margins.
The overall mean margins of the Adv. model is marginally
larger than that of the Ori. model. The F.L. model has highest
TABLE II: Mean margins of class center images (CCI) found in different CIFAR-10 models.
CCI Model 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Avg. Std.
Ori.
Ori. 239.567 49.505 252.513 65.123 53.959 26.399 155.302 31.591 50.915 56.208 98.1082 85.681
Adv. 27.161 75.020 245.622 50.273 79.537 45.759 255 66.710 89.535 56.269 99.089 81.728
F.L. 25.143 219.195 235.856 111.182 207.838 84.16 255 97.96 194.448 36.047 146.6829 85.323
Reduced F.L. 28.888 142.801 251.285 95.455 230.259 76.429 255 111.232 198.483 33.115 142.2947 86.766
F.L.
Ori. 26.615 49.505 248.739 37.857 53.959 16.805 82.651 26.325 47.715 39.919 63.009 67.783
Adv. 89.823 75.020 233.650 52.883 79.537 67.908 254.547 57.907 83.937 98.880 109.409 72.486
F.L. 150.723 219.195 255 132.132 207.838 117.963 255 107.617 206.296 190.074 184.1838 54.176
Reduced F.L. 219.107 142.801 176.329 171.791 230.259 106.657 255 91.034 190.249 137.5 172.0727 53.460
overall mean margins and low standard deviations in both
CCI cases, followed by the Reduced F.L. model with slightly
worse performances.
• In comparing CCI sets, the F.L.’s CCI set has the largest
mean margins (except on the Ori. model) and the smallest
standard deviations on all four models.
The results demonstrate that the retraining with cross-
boundary examples always improve margin robustness, which is
in consist with the proof in Section IV-C. Employing feedback
learning method additionally alleviates the inter-class inequality
problem by increasing the margins in vulnerable directions.
B. Robustness Improvement and Decision Space Analysis
Table III compares the accuracy performance of Ori., Adv.,
and F.L. models on multiple evasion attack methods: fast
gradient sign method (FGSM) [18], Carlini & Wagner (CW-
L2) [21], projected gradient descent (PGD) [31], basic iterative
method (BIM) [24], momentum iterative method (MIM) [38],
DeepFool [34], random noise (with a uniform distribution),
and Gaussian noise. Please note that all attack parameters were
carefully tuned for better effectiveness display (so that none of
the models should perform worse than a random guess). For
adversarial-related attacks, the Adv. model is the most accurate
overall, while feedback learning improves model robustness
to a certain extent. As to random and Gaussian noise attacks,
feedback learning clearly reaches the best accuracies on both
datasets, while the Adv. model’s robustness could be destroyed
against non-adversarial attacks (especially on low-resolution
datasets such as MNIST).
The result shows our method can improve accuracies on
both adversarial-based examples and non-adversarial examples,
compared to the Ori. model. The reason why the F.L. model
doesn’t achieve better result than the Adv. model on adversarial-
based examples is that the latter is trained especially for these
kinds of attacks. As we can see that the Adv. model has worse
results on non-adversarial examples than the F.L. model.
TABLE III: Model robustness against different attacks.
Attacks
MNIST CIFAR-10
Ori. Adv. F.L. Ori. Adv. F.L.
FGSM 50.50% 97.57% 76.96% 36.60% 83.70% 56.20%
CW-L2 39.40% 94.50% 51.63% 9.30% 54.20% 20.30%
PGD 18.62% 98.03% 64.54% 38.90% 85.20% 60.80%
BIM 15.36% 97.95% 56.39% 31.20% 85.10% 51.20%
MIM 38.08% 97.94% 76.39% 44.20% 85.10% 60.30%
DeepFool 32.92% 64.36% 44.75% 36.60% 83.70% 56.20%
Random 78.19% 31.09% 91.07% 45.40% 84.20% 87.50%
Gaussian 77.31% 34.77% 90.65% 79.14% 86.59% 90.58%
Furthermore, we measured and calculated the margins and
robustness of all the four models. Please note that we omit the
class “N/A” in Table I, because the margin is large enough to
be ignored if no adjacent class found. The heat maps of mean
margin matrices in Figure 4 give visual comparisons between
the Ori. and F.L. models’ margin measurements. Mean margin
matrices of the Adv. and Reduced F.L. models are not shown
due to page limit. Here, MNIST samples are scaled to [0, 1]
and CIFAR-10 samples are kept in original format [0, 255]
in pixel value. For MNIST dataset, as class “3” and “4” fall
into “high-level robustness” category and class “0” and “1”
have “low-level robustness” in the Ori. model, more samples
were generated for retraining in class “0” and “1” than class
“3” and “4” as defined in Section IV-B. After retraining with
feedback learning, the mean margins of class “3” and “4”
slightly decrease, while other classes’ mean margins increase.
We also note that more margins are beyond searching range
(which is half of the pixel value range, 0.5 for MNIST and
127.5 for CIFAR-10) after retraining. These changes result in
an overall improved summed margin and mean margin. For
CIFAR-10 dataset, the improvement is more significant.
Moreover, we calculate the robustness levels: ROri. = 36.15,
RAdv. = 31.74, RF.L. = 39.12, and RReduced F.L. = 35.52
on MNIST; and ROri. = 2035.13, RAdv. = 3969.10, RF.L. =
4634.36, and RReduced F.L. = 3306.59 on CIFAR-10. Here,
margins with no adjacent class are counted as the maximum
searching range. The results prove that our feedback learning
method substantially increases the margins from samples to
decision boundaries and also ensure models have larger overall
margins comparing those obtained from retaining without
considering inter-class inequality. More analyses on causes
of such results are given in Section V-C.
C. Class Robustness Comparison
Table IV compares class robustness of four models: Ori.,
Adv., F.L. and Reduced F.L.. The Adv. model controls neither
model robustness nor class robustness, thus it has the most
unstable performance among all. Feedback learning improves
overall class margins with acceptable expense: Several “high-
level” and “medium-level robustness” classes may become
more vulnerable (such as “3” and “4” for both datasets), while
“low-level robustness” classes have remarkably better robustness.
Without considering inter-class inequality, the Reduced F.L.
model still achieves better robustness than the Ori. model, but
relatively worse than the F.L. model in the sense of overall
margins and standard deviations.
(a) Ori. MNIST model. (b) F.L. MNIST model.
(c) Ori. CIFAR-10 model. (d) F.L. CIFAR-10 model.
Fig. 4: Mean margin matrices comparisons between (a) & (b) MNIST and (c) & (d) CIFAR-10 models. Grey blocks mean no
adjacent class exist for given origin and destination (adjacent) classes.
TABLE IV: Class robustness of different models. For the F.L. model, 4: Maximum selection for “low-level robustness” classes,
: Medium selection for “medium-level robustness” classes, 5: Minimum selection for “high-level robustness” classes.
MNIST 0 4 1 4 2 4 3 5 4 5 5  6 4 7 4 8  9 4 Avg. Std.
Ri,Ori. 0.005 0.149 0.955 7.237 6.662 2.135 0.661 0.187 3.075 0.176 2.124 2.73
Ri,Adv. 0.702 0.007 4.425 1.511 0.221 1.296 0.922 0.182 3.603 0.293 1.316 1.517
Ri,F.L. 29.316 31.268 15.408 0.009 0.007 1.856 10.387 2.318 5.858 25.966 12.24 12.48
Ri,Reduced F.L. 3.665 32.208 0.041 0.553 128.07 0.809 0.388 1.227 1.049 0.001 16.80 40.32
CIFAR-10 0 4 1 4 2 5 3  4  5 4 6 5 7 4 8  9 4 Avg. Std.
Ri,Ori. 0.032 0.011 14.005 0.888 0.565 0.021 1.110 0.002 0.151 0.029 1.681 4.349
Ri,Adv. 0.066 0.0074 1.768 0.104 1.240 0.013 25.46 0.299 0.031 0.497 2.948 7.93
Ri,F.L. 0.020 0.059 9.147 0.343 0.573 0.023 11.209 0.015 0.231 0.052 2.167 4.254
Ri,Reduced F.L. 0.721 0.894 14.628 0.057 0.128 0.121 1.559 0.470 0.197 0.066 1.884 4.503
Why does the F.L. model achieve better results than the
Reduced F.L. model, even when the latter employs more
examples in retraining? This is because the total capacity of
the decision space is constant, and decision boundaries are
only borders to partition the given space. Retraining with
any technique will only relocate boundaries and redistrict
class regions. As the inter-class inequality problem exists,
training each class with the same emphasis won’t increase
classes’ robustness simultaneously, but may even result in
severer maldistribution of class domains. This also explains
why RReduced F.L. is even smaller than ROri. on MNIST.
Feedback learning attempts to relax such an inequality by
allowing vulnerable classes to make more contributions to the
models, thus the boundary relocation is more controllable.
D. Computation Complexity Analysis
The boundary search is the most computation-consuming
part in our feedback learning method. As the dimension of
inputs increase, the computation cost will go up. The following
two explanations/solutions could greatly alleviate this issue.
• The boundary search happens before the retraining process,
which means it is conducted only once for each model.
What’s more, the margin information can be reused to further
retrain the model multiple times until the model reaches the
desired robustness performance;
• The boundary search in each direction for each sample can
be highly parallel. This won’t reduce the computation cost
but will greatly shorten the searching time. Here we assume
the major concern is model robustness and computation time,
not the computing power. Thus, our method can be deployed
on datasets with high dimensional inputs.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we first analyze the model robustness in
the decision space. According to it, we propose a feedback
learning method to understand how well a model learns and
facilitate the model’s retraining to remedy the defects. A set of
distance-based criteria for model robustness evaluation show
that our method can significantly improve models accuracy
and robustness against different types of attacks. Moreover,
we observe the existence of inter-class inequality, which can
be compensated by changing the proportions of examples
generated in each class.
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